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Abstract: This paper examines cultural differences in attitudes towards corruption by analysing 
individual-decision making in a corrupt experimental environment. Attitudes towards corruption 
play a critical role in the persistence of corruption. Our experiments differentiate between the 
incentives to engage in corrupt behaviour and the incentives to punish corrupt behaviour and 
allow us to explore whether, in environments characterized by lower levels of corruption, there is 
both a lower propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour and a higher propensity to punish corrupt 
behaviour. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) 
and Singapore, we find that there is more variation in the propensities to punish corrupt 
behaviour than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour across cultures. The results 
reveal that the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance towards corruption than the subjects in 
Australia while the subjects in Indonesia behave similarly to those in Australia. The subjects in 
Singapore have a higher propensity to engage in corruption than the subjects in Australia. We 
also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of a more effective punishment system 
and the effect of the perceived cost of bribery. 
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1. Introduction 
  Corruption is a pervasive phenomenon. Transparency International finds that of the 133 
countries evaluated for its 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) “Seven out of ten countries 
score less than 5 out of a clean score of 10…. Nine out of ten developing countries score less 
than 5 against a clean score of 10….”
1 Corruption is a particularly troubling phenomenon in 
developing countries because of its negative impact on economic growth. It undermines 
development by weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends 
(Klitgaard, 1988; Bardhan, 1997). Mauro (1995) shows that countries with higher corruption 
rates have a lower ratio of total and private investment to GDP, and, consequently, lower 
economic growth.  
  Given its large negative impact, much stands to be gained from understanding the causes 
of corruption and the ways in which it can be reduced.
2 The aim of this paper is to contribute to 
our understanding of corruption by analysing individual decision-making in a corrupt 
experimental environment. We report findings from an experiment designed to explore whether 
attitudes towards corruption differ across cultures. Attitudes towards corruption play a critical 
role in the persistence of corruption.
3 They may differ across cultures as a result of different 
levels of exposure to corruption. That is, higher levels of exposure to corruption in daily life may 
promote a tolerance of corruption that is reflected in norms of behaviour. A corrupt environment 
                                                 
1 See http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi for information on the CPI. Table A1 in the Appendix 
contains a selective list of country rankings from the 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This Index ranks 
countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among politicians and public officials. It 
reflects the views of analysts and business people around the world, including experts living in the countries 
evaluated.  
2 Previous studies have discussed the importance of deregulation, civil service reform, inter-governmental 
competition and an effective legal system in reducing corruption. See, for example, Rose-Ackerman (1978). Glaeser 
and Goldin (2004) discuss the historical factors that may have helped reduce corruption in the United States. 
3 The fact that countries with similar degrees of development may have significantly different levels of corruption 
suggests that corruption may at least partially be a cultural phenomenon. For instance, Finland, with a 2002 per 
capita GDP of 26,495 USD, is ranked 1st in the 2003 edition of the CPI while Italy with a 2002 per capita GDP of 
25,568 USD is ranked 35
th. Portugal, with a 2002 per capita GDP of 18,434 USD is ranked 25
th while Greece with a 
2002 per capita GDP of 18,439 USD is ranked 50
th.    2
may make it easier to justify one’s own corrupt behaviour. Hence, corruption may gain more 
acceptance as it becomes more widespread and such acceptance of corruption may contribute to 
its further spread and sustenance (Dey, 1989).  
  The set of actions that fall under the rubric of “corrupt acts” is large. We define 
corruption as a situation where two people can act to increase their own payoff at the expense of 
a third person, the victim. We assume that the transaction that takes place between the two 
people is illegal, so the victim is allowed to punish them. However, punishment is costly to the 
victim. As suggested by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Bowles and Gintis (2002), such “altruistic” 
punishment by homo reciprocans, humans who are willing to punish norm violators even when 
such punishment is costly to the punishers, may be the primary driving force behind sustaining 
cooperative norms in a variety of social dilemmas.  
  Several papers in the theoretical literature on corruption focus on the cultural aspects of 
corruption (e.g., Andvig and Moene, 1990; Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002; Lui, 1986; Sah, 1988; 
Tirole, 1996). However, empirical support for the cultural aspects of corruption is harder to find 
due to the aggregate nature of most of the existing data on corruption.
4 Experimental 
methodology provides us with a unique opportunity to explore how individuals’ attitudes 
towards corruption differ across cultures.  
  We assume individuals’ attitudes towards corruption are shaped by the social, political, 
legal and economic systems of the countries they live in as well as their everyday experiences of 
corruption. We refer to all these elements that shape individuals’ attitudes as culture. It is 
important to define what we mean by attitudes towards corruption. We differentiate between the 
incentive to engage in a corrupt act from which one reaps benefits and the incentive to incur a 
                                                 
4 Treisman (2000) is one empirical study that uses country level data to analyse the cultural foundations of 
corruption.    3
cost to punish a corrupt act which decreases one’s payoff. This distinction enables us to examine 
whether individuals’ behaviour differ depending on whether they directly benefit from a corrupt 
act.  
  Our goal is to explore whether, in environments characterized by lower levels of 
corruption, there is both a lower propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour and a higher 
propensity to punish corrupt behaviour. We report findings from experiments conducted in four 
countries: Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Singapore. We have 
chosen to run our experiments in two countries that are consistently ranked among the least 
corrupt countries in the world (Australia and Singapore, with scores of 8.8 and 9.4 out of 10 
respectively) and two countries that are consistently ranked among the most corrupt (India and 
Indonesia, with scores of 2.8 and 1.9 respectively).
5 Moreover, Singapore and Indonesia are 
included in our sample because both have experienced relatively recent changes in institutional 
structure, albeit of a very different nature. In Singapore, the approach to eradicating corruption 
has been strictly top-down. The government has imposed and strongly enforced strict anti-
corruption laws and has been successful in reducing corruption in a relatively short time period 
(approximately 40 years).  Indonesia still has a high level of corruption, but it has recently 
become a democracy (in 1998) and is seeing the emergence of a free and independent press. 
These institutional changes have been accompanied by a groundswell of public opinion 
condemning corruption.  
  Our results indicate that there is a larger variation in the propensities to punish corrupt 
behaviour than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour across countries. Specifically, 
there are no differences in the propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour, but a significant 
difference in the propensities to punish corrupt behaviour between Australia and India. Hence, 
                                                 
5 See Table A1.    4
the subjects in Australia, a country characterized by a low level of corruption, tend to be more 
critical of corrupt behaviour that they observe in others than they are of corrupt behaviour of 
which they are the direct beneficiary. When we analyse behaviour in the two countries with 
recent institutional changes, Indonesia and Singapore, we surprisingly find results different from 
what is implied by the reported levels of corruption in these countries. While the subjects in 
Indonesia have the same attitudes towards corruption as the subjects in Australia, the subjects in 
Singapore exhibit a higher tolerance towards corruption than the subjects in Australia.  
  In addition to examining differences in attitudes towards corruption across cultures, we 
varied our experimental treatment to examine whether the propensity to engage in corrupt 
behaviour varies with the effectiveness of the existing legal system and the cost of corruption. 
We assume that a more effective punishment system allows the victim to mete out a larger 
punishment and conducted experiments with both a low and high punishment regime. We varied 
the cost of corruption by conducting one treatment with a welfare-enhancing bribe, where the 
total payoff gains from the bribe exceed the total payoff loss, and another treatment with a 
welfare-reducing bribe, where the reverse is true.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related experimental 
literature. Section 3 explains the experimental design and procedure. Section 4 presents the 
results and discusses their implications. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Previous  Experimental Literature on Corruption and Punishment 
  The experimental literature examining corruption is scarce. Abbink, Irlenbusch and 
Renner (2002) model corruption as a variant of the two-person trust and reciprocation game, 
where the participants play the role of a briber or a public official. They find that the fact that a 
corrupt act has a negative externality on the other participants does not result in a lower level of   5
corruption. However, the introduction of a threat of high penalties when discovered significantly 
reduces corruption. Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000) differentiate between positive and 
negative reciprocity in their trust and reciprocation game and find that subjects engage in 
negative reciprocity more often. Barr, Lindelow and Serneels (2004) study the embezzlement of 
public resources using nursing students in Ethiopia. They find that corruption is less likely to 
take place when service providers earn more income, and when the risk of being caught and 
sanctioned is high. Frank and Schulze (2000) find that economics students are significantly more 
corrupt than others. They show that this is due to a process of self-selection rather than 
indoctrination and argue that it is the more self-interested students who choose to study 
economics. 
  Our paper differs from these papers in two main ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first one to focus on how individual attitudes towards corruption 
differ across cultures. In doing so, we contribute to a growing experimental literature on cross-
cultural comparisons of behaviour.
6 Second, as discussed above and unlike previous studies, we 
are able to examine both the incentives to engage in corruption and the incentives to punish 
corrupt behaviour. The previous studies on corruption model punishment as an exogenous 
lottery. In our paper, punishment is endogenous and takes place if the victim decides to incur the 
cost to punish.  
  The way we model punishment has some similarities with the literature on the impact of 
sanctions (formal or informal) on individual behaviour. In recent years, there has been a growing 
interest in this area. Fehr and Gachter (2000) show that the cooperators in a public goods game 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Carpenter and Cardenas (2004), Croson and Buchan (1999), Roth et al. (1991) and Henrich et al. 
(2004).   6
display a widespread willingness to punish the free riders.
7 Their results reveal that in the 
presence of formal monetary punishment opportunities, there is less free riding in these games. 
Masclet et al. (2003) find that nonmonetary sanctions can also lead to high cooperation levels. 
These papers examine the impact of punishment in a game where the punishment is meted out by 
those who are directly affected by others’ free riding. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) and Carpenter 
and Matthews (2004) show that punishment by a third party, whose payoffs are not affected by 
the norm violation, is another way of deterring non-cooperation.
8   
   
3. Experimental  Methodology 
3.1 Design 
  We are interested in examining whether there are differences in the propensities to 
engage in and the propensities to punish corrupt behaviour across cultures with different 
experiences of corruption. To this end, we have designed a three-person, sequential-move game 
that focuses on a common bribery problem. The first player is a firm who has the option of 
initiating a corrupt act by offering a bribe to a government official in order to increase its own 
payoff at the expense of society. The second player, whom we call the official, can either reject 
or accept the bribe. The third player represents society and is called the citizen. This player can 
respond to the act of corruption by choosing to punish both the firm and the official. The 
punishment is costly to the citizen, and imposes a monetary sanction on the firm and the official. 
  Figure 1 contains an extensive-form representation of the game, where all of the payoffs 
are denoted in experimental dollars. We constrain the amount of the bribe that the firm can offer 
                                                 
7 In a public goods game, each player receives an initial endowment and is asked to contribute a fraction of the 
endowment to a group account, keeping the remainder. The funds in the group account provide a positive return to 
each member of the group. Though it is in the group’s interest to maximise the contributions, the dominant strategy 
for each player is to contribute zero to the group account (i.e., to free ride). 
8 Bowles and Gintis (2002), Fehr, Fischbacher and Gachter (2002), and Casari and Plott (2003) provide further 
evidence on how punishment can have an impact on behaviour and social norms.    7
to B ∈ [4, 8]. It costs the firm two experimental dollars to offer a bribe and the firm incurs this 
cost regardless of whether the bribe is accepted. If a bribe is offered, then the official decides 
whether to accept it. If the official accepts the bribe (which automatically implies favorable 
treatment of the firm), then the payoffs of the firm and the official increase by 3B while the 
payoff of the citizen decreases. Hence, the net benefit to the firm from paying the bribe is 3B – 2. 
This may, for example, be the benefit the firm gets from avoiding a regulation. As far as the 
official is concerned, we assume that the official’s payoff increases by 3B even though the 
amount of bribe paid by the firm is B. This is due to a difference in the marginal utility of 
income. Since the income earned in the public service is likely to be lower than that earned in 
private firms, the same amount of money can be assumed to have a lower marginal utility value 
to the firm than to the official. Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002) make a similar assumption 
in their paper. As in their paper, this multiplier also has the additional advantage of helping us 
prevent negative total payoffs.  
  If a bribe has been offered and accepted, the citizen, who moves last after observing the 
choices made by the firm and the official, is given a chance to punish the firm and the official for 
the corrupt transaction. The citizen can choose an amount P in punishment. Such punishment is 
costly for the citizen and reduces the citizen’s payoff by the amount of the punishment, P. 
However, if the citizen chooses to punish, then the payoffs of the firm and the official are 
reduced by three times the amount of the punishment chosen by the citizen. 
  In the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, a payoff-maximizing citizen does not 
punish. Knowing this, the official accepts the bribe and the firm offers the bribe. Moreover, the 
firm offers the maximum amount of bribe it can since its payoff is increasing in the amount it 
offers.    8
  We have deliberately chosen to conduct a one-shot game because in a one-shot game the 
punishment has no economic benefit to the citizen and so the decision to punish is not affected 
by the anticipation of possible future economic gains. If we observe any punishment by the 
citizens, we can infer that it is motivated by either negative reciprocity or moral considerations. 
Hence, with a one-shot game, a comparison of the citizens’ willingness to punish across different 
cultures reveals the differences in the tolerance levels for corrupt acts across the different 
cultures. The citizens who choose to punish in a one-shot game would have even more incentives 
to punish in a multi-period game since by doing so, they can deter corruption and decrease the 
harm they suffer.  
  The one-shot nature of the game also helps us avoid the issues associated with repeated 
games, such as signalling, reputation formation and serial correlation in decisions. Hence, each 
subject in our database participated in the experiment only once and played only one role.
9 The 
subjects playing the three roles were grouped anonymously in the experiment to avoid conscious 
or unconscious signalling. 
3.2 Procedure  
  Each experiment lasted about an hour. At the end of each session, the payoffs were 
converted into cash using an appropriate conversion rate, taking into consideration purchasing 
power parity across the countries where the experiment was conducted.
10 To guarantee parity in 
                                                 
9 One standard response in cases such as these is to have random re-matching of subjects. Kandori (1992) states that 
it is not clear whether random re-matchings do actually succeed in eliminating supergame effects. However, Duffy 
and Ochs (2005) consider an experiment with an indefinitely repeated 2-player prisoner’s dilemma game and find 
that contrary to Kandori’s theoretical conjecture, a cooperative norm does not emerge in the treatments where 
players are matched randomly. In the current paper we decided to adopt a conservative stance and have players 
participate in pure one-shot games to avoid any repeated game effects.   
10 The conversion rates in each country were based on 1) the standard hourly wage paid for a student research 
assistant in each country, and 2) a typical basket of goods bought by students in each country. This is similar to the 
procedure used by other researchers who have conducted cross-cultural studies (e.g., Carpenter and Cardenas, 2004 
and Cardenas and Carpenter, 2005).   9
the payoffs to the different type of players (firm, official and citizen), we used a different 
conversion rate for each type.
11 These conversion rates were public information. 
  The experiments were run at the University of Melbourne, the Delhi School of 
Economics, the University of Indonesia, and the National University of Singapore using third 
year undergraduate or postgraduate students. In order to minimize the experimenter effects, we 
made sure that one of the authors (the same one) was present in all the countries where we ran 
the experiment.
12 All the sessions were run as non-computerized experiments. 1935 subjects 
participated once and only once as a firm, an official, or a citizen.  
  Given the large number of subjects involved and the non-computerized nature of the 
experiments, the logistics of running the sessions posed a challenge. At the beginning of each 
session subjects were asked to come to a large lecture theatre. Each session consisted of at least 
30 subjects. These subjects, on entering the room, were randomly designated as either firms, 
officials or citizens. Each group was located far apart from the others in a recognizable cluster. 
Thus, each group could see the members of the other groups, but individual subjects were 
unaware of which three specific subjects constituted a particular firm-official-citizen trio.  
  At the beginning of each session, each subject received a copy of the game’s instructions, 
which were then read out loud to them. They were also given a number of examples explaining 
how the payoffs would be calculated for specific bribe and punishment amounts. Then, the 
subjects playing the role of a firm were asked to decide whether or not to offer a bribe. If they 
chose to offer a bribe, they also had to choose an amount. The record sheets with the bribe 
amounts were then collected and distributed by the experimenter to the corresponding officials. 
                                                 
11 In Australia, the conversion rates were 3 experimental currency = 1 real currency for the firms, 2 experimental 
currency = 1 real currency for the officials and 1.5 experimental currency = 1 real currency for the citizens. Each 
subject made on average AU$20. This amount is approximately equivalent to US$15. In India subjects were paid an 
average of US$11, in Singapore US$13, and in Indonesia US$9. 
12 Roth et al. (1991) and Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) discuss the methodological issues arising in multi-site 
experiments.   10
After the officials made their decisions, the corresponding citizens were informed about whether 
a bribe was offered and whether it was accepted. The game ended after the citizens decided 
whether to punish by choosing a punishment amount. The decisions made by all of the subjects 
were entered into a spreadsheet which generated their payoffs. The subjects were paid at the end 
of each session. 
  All the subjects filled out a demographic survey, which asked them a series of questions 
on age, gender, income, education stream, employment history, and frequency of exposure to 
corruption. Those in the role of the citizen were also asked to explain the motivation for their 
decisions.
13  
We should point out that we deliberately chose to use emotive terms such as “bribe” and 
“punishment” in the instructions. This is a deviation from the standard practice of using neutral 
language in economics experiments. However, since our aim was to simulate a real-life corrupt 
transaction, we used loaded language. As indicated in Harrison and List (2004), “it is not the 
case that abstract, context-free experiments provide more general findings if the context itself is 
relevant to the performance of subjects (p. 1022).”   
  In addition to the 1935 observations that we report in the paper, we have also collected 
data using a neutral language treatment where we eschewed words such as “bribe” or 
“punishment.” They were replaced by words such as “transfer” and “forego money to reduce 
others’ payoff” respectively. Among the 132 subjects that participated in this treatment, the 
behaviour was closer to the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. In particular, the punishment 
levels were lower in the neutral language sessions suggesting that the subjects participating in the 
                                                 
13 The instruction, record and survey sheets are available from the authors upon request.   11
loaded language sessions respond to the context given to them. We refer to the results from these 
data as and when appropriate in footnotes in the rest of the paper.
14  
3.3 Treatments 
  We conducted the following three treatments to examine whether the effectiveness of the 
punishment regime and the cost of the bribe affect behaviour. Treatment 1 corresponds to the 
low punishment regime, where we restricted the range of the punishment to P ∈ [2, 8]. Treatment 
2 corresponds to the high punishment regime, where we allowed the citizen to choose a 
punishment level P ∈ [2, 12].
15 Our goal in designing Treatments 1 and 2 was to observe 
whether a more effective punishment system decreases the incentives to engage in corrupt 
behaviour and increases the incentives to punish corrupt behaviour. An alternative way of 
designing a more effective punishment system would be to increase the multiplier on the 
punishment level chosen by the citizen. However, we chose to increase the punishment options 
available to the citizens since we were also interested in examining whether the choice set 
available to the subject affects behaviour. In other words, we wanted to observe whether the 
availability of higher punishment amounts resulted in an increase in the frequency of subjects 
who chose a punishment level P ∈ [2, 8]. Such behaviour would indicate that the effectiveness of 
the system matters.  
  In both Treatments 1 and 2, the bribe is welfare-enhancing, in that the total payoff gains 
to the firm and the official exceed the payoff loss to the citizen. In Treatment 3, using a high 
punishment regime, we considered a welfare-reducing bribe game, where the combined gains to 
                                                 
14 Cooper and Kagel (2003) consider the role of loaded language in signaling games and suggest that the use of a 
meaningful context might better capture behaviour in field settings than the use of neutral language. However, 
Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002) find that the use of words like “bribe” do not make a difference in the 
corruption game that they study.  
15 These values were chosen to guarantee two things. First, we wanted to ensure that no one obtained a negative 
payoff. Second, we wanted to make sure that the payoffs were not unduly inequitable. Often, if the payoffs are 
excessively unequal, it leads to confounding changes in behaviour.    12
the firm and the official are less than the payoff loss to the citizen. Specifically, in the welfare-
enhancing bribe game, each dollar offered in bribe, if accepted, reduces the payoff to the citizen 
by $1 whereas in the welfare-reducing bribe game, it reduces the payoff to the citizen by $7. 
Figures 1 and 2 describe the associated payoffs to the three players in the welfare-enhancing 
bribe game and the welfare-reducing bribe game respectively.
16 These two game structures are 
designed to represent the concepts of beneficial corruption, where bribery is assumed to be good 
or essential for economic growth, and detrimental corruption, where bribery is assumed to inhibit 
economic progress.   
  The distinction between welfare-enhancing and welfare-reducing corruption is one that is 
frequently made in the literature.
17 As an example, consider the scenario where a firm would like 
to import certain goods, but it needs to obtain a license to do so. In order to acquire the license, 
the firm has to bribe a government official. Here, although undoubtedly corrupt, the immediate 
social cost of this action is possibly not very high. In contrast, consider the case where the same 
firm manages to bribe its way out of complying with some environmental regulations and dumps 
toxic waste into the groundwater. Our goal in running Treatments 2 and 3 is to explore whether 
the tendency to engage in and punish corrupt behaviour is different in the latter case, where the 
cost of bribery is potentially far greater. 
  Our approach to the welfare implications of bribery is different from the approach of 
Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002), who examine whether behaviour changes when the 
corrupt act imposes a negative externality (in the form of a fixed monetary damage) on the other 
participants in the experiment. In contrast, we explore the welfare implications of bribery by 
                                                 
16 The games are welfare-enhancing and welfare-reducing both before and after taking into account the relevant 
conversion rates.  
17 See, for example, Ali and Isse (2003), Kaufman and Wei (1999), Bardhan (1997), Nas, Price and Weber (1986), 
and Lui (1986).   13
varying the harm it imposes on the victim. We analyse how sensitive the citizen’s behaviour is to 
the level of harm they experience rather than the level of harm others experience.  
A change in the cost of bribery may have the following effects on subject behaviour. 
When the bribe is welfare-reducing, the subjects may think that it is less justified. Moreover, as 
the harm imposed on the citizen increases, the citizen may choose to punish due to feelings of 
negative reciprocity. Both of these effects would result in lower bribe amounts and higher 
punishment amounts being chosen when the bribe is welfare-reducing. Alternatively, if the harm 
imposed on the citizen is sufficiently large, the citizen may not want to punish and decrease 
his/her payoff by even more. As a result, punishment may occur less frequently, and if the firms 
and officials anticipate this, they may act more corruptly. Hence, whether we observe higher 
levels of bribery and punishment in Treatment 3 than in Treatment 2 depends on the relative 
magnitude of these effects. 
 
4. Results 
4.1   Overview of the results 
  Table 1 summarizes the data we collected in terms of the treatments we ran at each 
location and the number of subjects involved in each treatment.
18 Figure 3 provides a broad 
overview of our findings. Overall 1935 subjects participated in 645 plays of the game across all 
treatments since it takes three players (a firm, an official and a citizen) to generate one play of 
the game. Note that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the firm offers the 
maximum amount of bribe possible, the official accepts, and the citizen does not punish. As can 
be seen from Figure 3, in 555 out of 645 (86.0%) plays of the game a bribe was offered by the 
                                                 
18 We do not have data for all three treatments in India, Indonesia and Singapore. Given the resource constraints we 
faced, we allocated the treatments such that we could compare behaviour in the different treatments using data 
collected from at least one low-corruption and one high-corruption country.     14
firm. The average amount of the bribe for those who chose to bribe was $7.50 (out of a range of 
4 to 8). 482 out of 555 (86.9%) officials who received a bribe chose to accept it. Both the firm’s 
and official’s behaviour is more or less in accordance with the theoretical predictions. However, 
the citizens’ behaviour deviates sharply from the theoretical prediction. 238 out of 482 (49.4%) 
citizens who were harmed by the bribe chose to incur a pecuniary cost in order to punish the firm 
and the official for their actions. The remaining 244 citizens (50.6%) chose not to punish.
19 
In the next two subsections, we present our findings in more detail. We first report the 
results on the cultural effects in Section 4.2. We then consider the impact of the punishment 
regime and the cost of bribery on individual behaviour in Section 4.3.  
4.2  Comparing Behaviour in Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore  
Since we are interested in both the propensity to initiate and accept bribes, and the 
propensity to punish bribery, we start by examining the decisions of the firms and the officials 
across the four countries in Section 4.2.1. Then we turn to the decision of the citizens in Section 
4.2.2. In Section 4.2.3 we discuss the implications of the results we present in the previous two 
subsections. 
The reported results are based on t-tests and multivariate regression analysis. We also 
conducted non-parametric rank sum tests of differences in distribution. Unless noted in the text, 
the results were the same as the ones in the reported t-tests.
20 We estimated binary probit models 
for the bribe, acceptance and punishment rates, and ordinary least square models for the bribe 
                                                 
19 The bribe and acceptance rates are higher in the neutral language games than they are in the loaded language 
games. There were 44 plays of the neutral language game. The bribe was offered in 39 (88%) of the cases 
(compared to 86% in the loaded language game). This bribe was accepted in 38 (97%) out of 39 of the cases 
(compared to 87% in the loaded language game). The most significant difference was in the punishment rates. Out 
of the 38 citizens in the neutral language game who were in a position to punish, 14 of them (37%) chose to punish 
(compared to 49% in the loaded language game).  
20 The rank sum test results are available from the authors on request.   15
and punishment amounts.
  The regression results control for several aspects of the subjects’ 
backgrounds based on the information collected in the surveys.  
4.2.1   Bribe and Acceptance Behaviour 
  We start by comparing the results from Australia and India, where we conducted the low 
punishment treatment (Treatment 1). As discussed above, India has a significantly higher 
corruption level than Australia and we are interested in examining whether this difference is 
reflected in the bribe and acceptance behaviour in the two countries. Figure 4A compares the 
bribe behaviour of the Australian and Indian subject pools. Table 2, Panel (i) summarises the 
behaviour of the three types of players and the results of t-tests for statistically significant 
differences in the means. We find no statistically significant difference in the rates at which a 
bribe was offered (p = 0.63). A bribe was offered in India in 94% of the cases while it was 
offered in Australia in 96% of the cases. Similarly, we find no significant differences in the bribe 
acceptance rates. The bribe was accepted in 90% of the cases in India and in 91% of the cases in 
Australia. The only significant difference we find between Australia and India is in the bribe 
amounts. The bribe amount offered in India is slightly lower than that offered in Australia (the 
average amounts were $7.37 and $7.70 respectively). This difference is statistically significant 
according to a test of difference of means (p = 0.03).  
  These results are consistent with the regression results presented in Table 4, Panel A, 
where we pool all of the data for all of the treatments across all of the countries, and in Table 4, 
Panel B, where we compare behaviour in Australia and India for Treatment 1. Columns 1-6 in 
Table 4 present the results for the bribe rate, acceptance rate and bribe amount respectively.
21 
Pooling the data allows us to compare the behaviour across the four countries while controlling 
                                                 
21 We also estimated ordered probit models for positive bribe amounts. These recognise that the dependent variable 
is not continuous. The results were very similar to the reported results from the estimation of ordinary least squares 
models.   16
for treatment effects as well as other variables not accounted for in the t-tests, such as gender, 
field of study (whether it is economics), and the percentage of each Australian subject’s life that 
has been spent outside of Australia.
22 Of the variables we collected information on, these were 
found to be the only ones that were consistently significant determinants of subject behaviour.
 23 
In the regressions for the officials’ behaviour, we also controlled for the bribe amount.  
  In Australia, Indonesia and Singapore we conducted both the welfare-enhancing and 
welfare-reducing treatments (Treatments 2 and 3). Figure 4B pools the results from these 
treatments and compares them across the three countries.
24 Given the high level of corruption 
that exists in Indonesia, as in the case of India, we expected the Indonesian subjects to display a 
relatively high tolerance of corruption. However, the graphs in Figure 4B are notable in that 
there is no striking difference between the firms’ behaviour in Australia and Indonesia. Table 2, 
Panels (ii)-(vii) compare the means of behaviour across the Australian, Indonesian and 
Singaporean subjects within each treatment. The summary statistics confirm our observations 
from the graphs. Specifically, the propensities to bribe, the bribe amounts, and the propensities to 
accept are all similar in Australia and Indonesia. The point estimates are more similar for 
Treatment 2 than for Treatment 3. In Treatment 3, they suggest a lower tolerance of corruption in 
Indonesia, where a smaller percentage of the subjects offered (78% in Indonesia versus 88% in 
Australia) and accepted bribes (79% in Indonesia versus 89% in Australia). However, the 
differences are not statistically significant (p = 0.13 in both cases). The regression results 
presented in Table 4, Panel A also indicate that the Indonesian subjects do not differ from the 
                                                 
22 The last variable controls for the high number of foreign students that study in Australian universities. The 
majority of these students come from Asia. We find this variable to be insignificant in explaining behaviour in most 
of the regressions. This is possibly because those who choose to study in Australia are more westernised than their 
counterparts and/or quickly absorb the social norms of the new environment.  
23 We collected information on age, gender, field of study, work experience, income, exposure to corruption and 
time spent in developed countries. 
24 We discuss how subject behaviour varies across welfare-enhancing and welfare-reducing treatments in Section 
4.3.2.    17
Australian subjects in terms of their propensities to offer and accept bribes. The bribe amount is 
marginally smaller in Indonesia as compared with that in Australia (significant at the 10% level).  
  The graphs in Figure 4B present the bribe behaviour in Australia and Singapore. The 
results reported in Table 2, Panels (iv) and (v) show that the bribe rate is lower in Australia in 
Treatment 2 (79% versus 86%) while it is lower in Singapore in Treatment 3 (88% versus 84%). 
In both treatments the acceptance rates of the officials is higher in Singapore than in Australia 
(81% versus 89% in Treatment 2 and 89% versus 96% in Treatment 3). None of these 
differences are statistically significant, which is in accordance with our expectations since 
Singapore is consistently ranked as a very low-corruption country. 
  However, once we turn to the regression results presented in Table 4, Panel A, we find 
that the difference between Australia and Singapore becomes more significant. The Singaporean 
subjects have a higher probability of offering bribes than the Australian subjects (significant at 
the 5% level). They are also more likely to accept bribes as compared to the Australian subjects 
(significant at the 10% level). Panels C and D of Table 4 show that this result is driven by 
behaviour in Treatment 2.  
  A comparison of the Indonesian and Singaporean subject behaviour shows that both the 
bribe and acceptance rates are also higher in Singapore than in Indonesia. Although the 
differences in the bribe rates are not statistically significant, the differences in the acceptance 
rates are statistically significant in both Treatments 2 and 3 (p = 0.10 and p = 0.01 respectively). 
This is also confirmed in the regression results presented in Panels E and F of Table 4, where 
dummies for Indonesia and Australia are included and Singapore is taken to be the reference 
dummy.  
  In summary, when we compare the propensities to offer and accept bribes across the four 
locations, we find that the Australian, Indian and Indonesian subjects display quite similar   18
behaviour while the Singaporean subjects seem to behave differently. We discuss the 
implications of these results in Section 4.2.3 after we present the results on the punishment 
behaviour. 
  The coefficients on the other control variables in the regressions show that the subjects 
who study economics have a higher probability of accepting bribes and a lower probability of 
punishing corruption. The Australian subjects’ probability of offering a bribe increases with the 
time they have spent outside of Australia.  As far as gender is concerned, the probability of 
offering a bribe is higher for men than for women (significant at the 10% level). Men were also 
more likely to accept bribes although this difference is not significant.
25 
4.2.2   Punishment Behaviour 
  We find larger differences between the four locations when we consider the punishment 
behaviour. Figure 5A displays the punishment patterns in Australia and India. As shown in Table 
2, Panel (i), only 24% of citizens chose to punish in India compared to 53% in Australia (p = 
0.0001). The amounts that these citizens handed out in punishment were also significantly 
different. In Australia, among the subjects who chose to punish, the average punishment amount 
was $5.40 while in India it was $3.71 (p = 0.01). These results are consistent with the pooled 
regression results presented in Table 4, Panels A and B, columns 7-10. We estimated probit 
models for the punishment rates and ordinary least squares models for the punishment amounts 
given out by the citizens for positive punishment amounts, controlling for the treatments, the 
bribe amount, and other variables as discussed in the previous subsection.
26 The regression 
                                                 
25 Recent empirical papers that have analyzed the link between gender and the level of corruption find that there 
exist systematic gender differences in attitudes towards corrupt behaviour. For example, Swamy et al. (2001) and 
Dollar et al. (2001) suggest, on the basis of survey evidence, that women are less tolerant of corruption. We report 
our findings from experiments in Alatas et al. (2005). 
26 Similar to the regressions on bribe amounts, we also estimated ordered probits for positive punishment amounts, 
which recognise that the dependent variable is not continuous. The results are very similar to the reported ordinary 
least squares results.   19
results show that the Indian subjects are 25 percentage points less likely to punish as compared to 
the Australian subjects. 
  The punishment behaviour in Indonesia (Figure 5B) suggests a lower tolerance of 
corruption as compared with Australia. As shown in Table 2, Panels (ii) and (iii), a greater 
percentage of Indonesians chose to punish under both of the treatments (73% versus 62% in 
Treatment 2 and 60% versus 42% in Treatment 3). However, as shown both in Table 2, Panels 
(ii) and (iii) and in Table 4, Panels C and D, only the difference observed in Treatment 3 is 
significant (at the 10% level). The punishment amounts do not differ significantly.  
  The Singaporean subjects punished less frequently as compared to the Australian and 
Indonesian subjects in Treatment 2 (44% in Singapore versus 62% in Australia and 73% in 
Indonesia). However, in Treatment 3, there are no significant differences in the punishment rates 
we observe in the three locations. Punishment amounts do not differ significantly in either 
treatment in these pairwise country comparisons. These treatment-specific differences are 
confirmed by the separate regressions we conducted for Treatments 2 and 3. The results reported 
in Table 4, Panels C and D show that the subjects in Singapore in Treatment 2 punished at a 
lower rate as compared to the Australian subjects. This difference is significant at the 10% level. 
In Treatment 3, they punish at a higher rate as compared to the corresponding Australian 
treatment, but this difference is not significant.   
  When we pool the treatments together (Table 4, Panel A), we find that there are no 
differences between the Australian and Singaporean subjects. This is because the coefficient on 
the Singapore dummy averages the differences between the two countries in the punishment rate 
across the two treatments. However, we find that the Singaporean subjects are 17 percentage 
points less likely to punish than the Indonesian subjects (p-value = 0.03), and 20 percentage 
points more likely to punish than the Indian subjects (p-value = 0.05). The largest difference is   20
found between the punishment behaviour of the Indian and Indonesian subjects. The Indonesian 
subjects are 35 percentage points more likely to punish than the Indian subjects and this 
difference is strongly statistically significant (p-value =0.001).
27  
  In summary, when we compare the punishment behaviour in the four locations, we find 
that the Indian subjects display dramatically different behaviour. The Australian and Indonesian 
subjects behave in similar ways while the Singaporean subjects punish less than the Australian 
(only in Treatment 2) and Indonesian subjects and more than the Indian subjects.  
  The regression results also reveal that the students majoring in economics have a 
significantly lower probability of punishing. Although men have a lower probability of 
punishing, the gender difference is not statistically significant. However, of the subjects who 
punish, men punish by higher amounts than women (significant at the 10% level). 
4.2.3  Insights on Attitudes Towards Corruption Across Cultures 
  The results above indicate that the propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour seem to be 
more similar across the four cultures we have considered than the propensities to condemn 
corrupt behaviour. Specifically, the Indian subjects are, in general, less willing to impose 
sanctions on others than the Australian subjects. However, when it comes to engaging in corrupt 
behaviour, the two samples are quite similar. This finding suggests that people are more ready to 
sanction behaviour socially regarded as immoral when they see it in others. That we find strong 
differences in punishment behaviour between the citizen subjects in Australia and the citizen 
subjects in India supports our conjecture that the Indian citizen subjects may be more tolerant of 
corruption than their Australian counterparts as a result of the greater prevalence of corruption in 
India. This bolsters the contention that prevailing social norms might be a significant 
                                                 
27 These findings are from an unreported regression equivalent to that in Table 4, Panel A, but with dummies for 
India, Singapore and Australia (omitting the Indonesian dummy), and with dummies for India, Indonesia and 
Australia (omitting the Singapore dummy). 
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contributory factor in the sustenance of corruption. Corruption flourishes in India because it is 
commonplace and looks “normal” and is routinely tolerated by the citizenry.  
  Our findings in Indonesia and Singapore are quite surprising. We find that subject 
behaviour in Indonesia is quite similar to that in Australia and contrasts with what one would 
expect based on the reported level of corruption in Indonesia. We conjecture that this may be due 
to the type of corruption that exists in Indonesia and the recent institutional changes that have 
occurred in this country. As discussed in Bardhan (1997), corruption in Indonesia has 
traditionally been more centralized (controlled largely by the first family and the top military 
leadership in cahoots with the ethnic Chinese-run conglomerates) while corruption in India is 
more fragmented (p. 1325). Since the introduction of democracy in Indonesia in 1998 and the 
relaxation of media restrictions, corruption has received a lot more negative media attention.
28 
There have been several attempts (some successful) to prosecute high profile cronies of the 
previous government who were engaged in corruption to the scale of billions of dollars. 
Although there is no doubt that corruption remains high in Indonesia, such open discussion and 
media disapproval have made the existing corruption in the political system more visible to the 
rest of society and have allowed for widespread public condemnation. Our results suggest that 
attitudes towards corruption may have consequently hardened in Indonesia and that the tolerance 
of corruption in Indonesia may currently be below that in India and comparable to that in 
Australia.
 29,30  
                                                 
28 That corruption receives more attention in Indonesia than in India is borne out by the percentage of newspaper 
articles that are devoted to the topic. In the time period April to June 2004, approximately 2 per cent of the total 
number of articles in Times of India relate to domestic corruption. In Indonesia nearly 9 percent of the articles in The 
Jakarta Post discussed corruption issues during this same time period. As a proportion of the number of articles on 
political issues, nearly 5 percent in India were on corruption as compared to 11 percent in Indonesia. The 
methodology we used to calculate these numbers is similar to the one used in Glaeser and Goldin (2004). 
29 Our conjecture is supported by Brunetti and Weder (2003). In a study that involves a large cross-section of 
countries, they find evidence of a significant negative relationship between press freedom and corruption. 
Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin (2004) also discuss how the rise of the informative press may have been one of the 
reasons why corruption declined in the US.    22
  To gain some insight into whether the subjects’ reasons for punishing differ across the 
four locations, we asked the citizens why they chose to punish/not to punish in the surveys given 
to them after they completed the experiment. Table 5 shows our categorization of their 
responses.
31 Of the citizens who got a chance to punish, more citizens in Indonesia stated that 
their intention in punishing is to reduce corruption (20% in Indonesia versus 8% in India, 8% in 
Singapore, and 18% in Australia). More also cite moral considerations as a reason for punishing 
(39% in Indonesia versus 14% in India, 20% in Singapore, and 32% in Australia). That 
corruption is still a serious problem in Indonesia can be seen in the reasons subjects give for not 
punishing. Of those who chose not to punish, a larger proportion in Indonesia claim that in the 
environment in which they operate, it is necessary to bribe (12% in Indonesia versus 0% in India, 
0% in Singapore and 4% in Australia) and that it is difficult to change the system and so easier to 
be corrupt (48% in Indonesia as compared to 21% in India, 18% in Singapore and 11% in 
Australia). The aversion to corruption that is evident in the Indonesian data can tentatively be 
taken as hopeful in terms of increasing the probability of pressure for and the success of future 
corruption eradication programs.   
  The results for Singapore indicate that the subjects there were more likely to engage in 
corrupt behaviour than the subjects in the other three countries. The punishment rates in 
Singapore are higher than those in India but lower than those in Australia. The differences 
between Australia and Singapore are striking given that Singapore consistently ranks as one of 
                                                                                                                                                               
30 India is of course a functioning democracy with a free press, but the relatively smaller scale of high-level 
corruption in India has not galvanized society to forcefully oppose corruption. Further, corruption was not a major 
issue at the time when democracy was introduced in India. In contrast, corruption was one of the major causes of the 
downfall of President Suharto and the advent of democracy in Indonesia. 
31 We categorized the stated reasons for punishment into four groups: moral responsibility, reduction of corruption, 
fairness, and negative reciprocity. Similarly, the reasons for not punishing were categorized into three groups 
depending on whether the subject is profit maximizing, believes that it is difficult to change the system, and thinks 
that the bribe may be necessary. These categories were not mutually exclusive, so the same person may have been 
counted in more than one category. We chose to create non-exclusive categories because often it was not possible to 
determine one single reason for the citizens’ behaviour from the statements provided in the surveys.   23
the least corrupt countries in the world. Hence, other things equal, one would expect the attitudes 
to corruption to be similar in Australia and Singapore. However, half a century ago the level of 
corruption in Singapore was comparable to that in India and Indonesia. It has successfully 
eradicated corruption by the imposition of strict and heavily-enforced anti-corruption legislation. 
Hence, one possible explanation for our results is that although the strict top-down approach in 
Singapore for the last 40 years has made Singaporeans less tolerant of corruption (e.g., vis-a-vis 
Indians), the attitudinal change that accompanies such an approach occurs only slowly and so 
more time is required for the attitudes towards corruption to change even further.  
  Table 5 shows that the citizen subjects in Singapore, when compared to those in Australia 
and Indonesia, were driven to a much greater extent by personal considerations rather than moral 
responsibility or an attempt to reduce corruption while choosing to punish. Only 20% of those 
who punished in Singapore reported doing so for reasons of moral responsibility (versus 320% in 
Australia, 14% in India, and 39% in Indonesia) and only 8% reported doing so to reduce 
corruption (versus 18% in Australia, 8% in India, and 20% in Indonesia).  
  It is important to keep in mind while making cultural comparisons that the experimental 
sample is from a particular city in a country. Especially in countries as diverse as India and 
Indonesia, there are many different cultures which are likely to display different attitudes 
towards corruption. In these countries, we conducted the experiments in the capital cities, Delhi 
and Jakarta, which can be argued to have a population that is more representative of the 
country’s culture.  
4.3  Impact of the Punishment Regime and Cost of Bribery  
  In this section, we discuss how sensitive subject behaviour is to the effectiveness of the 
punishment regime and the cost of bribery. We start by comparing the results we have from 
Treatments 1 and 2 in Australia in Section 4.3.1. We then turn to a comparison of the results we   24
have from Treatments 2 and 3 in Australia, Indonesia and Singapore in order to analyse the 
effect of the cost of bribery on behaviour.  
4.3.1  Low versus High Punishment Regimes (Treatment 1 versus Treatment 2) 
  By varying the punishment regime, we examine whether the existence of legal 
institutions which allow citizens to punish those that engage in corrupt behaviour more 
effectively reduces the prevalence of corruption.  
  Figure 6 presents graphs of the distribution of the bribe amounts offered by the firms and 
the punishment amounts chosen by the citizens under each punishment regime in Australia. 
Panel A(i) in Table 3 presents the means summarising the behaviour of the three types of players 
and the results of the t-tests for statistically significant differences in means across the different 
treatments. The results show that when the citizens are given the opportunity to punish the firms 
and officials more harshly, i.e., when P ∈ [2,12] as in Treatment 2 as opposed to P ∈ [2,8] as in 
Treatment 1, the possibility of a greater punishment affects the firms’ behaviour. 96% of the 
firms offered a bribe in the low punishment treatment while only 79% did in the high punishment 
treatment. This difference is statistically significant (p <0.01). The actual bribe amounts offered, 
however, do not differ across the two treatments ($7.70 versus $7.65). Thus, those firms who did 
offer a bribe behaved in a similar manner in both of the treatments, but many more firms seemed 
to have perceived the threat of punishment by the citizens as being greater in the high 
punishment regime and, therefore, preferred to refrain from offering a bribe.  
  The reaction from the government officials is similar. The propensity to accept a bribe is 
lower when there is the possibility of a more hefty punishment (81% versus 91% with a p-value 
of 0.05). These findings for the firms and officials are consistent with the results in Abbink et al. 
(2002) and Barr et al. (2003). They also observe that imposing higher penalties reduces corrupt 
behaviour. The citizens’ behaviour reveals that the fear of greater punishment is not without a   25
basis. Under the high punishment regime more citizens chose to punish (62% versus 53%) with 
the average amount being slightly higher (6.0 versus 5.4) although these differences are not 
statistically significant.
 These results are consistent with the regression results presented in Table 
6 , Panel A, where Treatment 2 is the reference dummy.  
  In Figure 6B, the distribution of the punishment amounts chosen by the subjects in 
Treatments 1 and 2 reveals that a larger percentage of subjects chose a punishment level P ∈ 
[2,7] in Treatment 2. For example, of the subjects who got a chance to punish, 14% of them 
chose a punishment of $2 in Treatment 1 while 20% of them chose a punishment of $2 in 
Treatment 2. It is also interesting to observe how the percentage of subjects who chose P = $8 
differs across the two treatments (21% in Treatment 1 versus 0.05% in Treatment 2). This 
difference suggests that in Treatment 1, some of these subjects chose $8 because they could not 
choose a higher amount.  
4.3.2  Welfare-Enhancing versus Welfare-Reducing Bribe Games (Treatment 2 versus 
Treatment 3) 
The final question we address is whether behaviour differs when the bribe is perceived as 
being harmful, i.e., when the payoff loss to the citizen exceeds the total payoff gain to the firm 
and the official. As discussed in Section 3.3, one would expect those subjects who are sensitive 
to the perceived cost of bribery, to offer and accept bribes less frequently and to punish more 
frequently in Treatment 3.
32 On the other hand, those citizen subjects who feel impoverished and 
disempowered as a result of the high cost of bribery may choose to punish less and those firms 
and officials that expect this may offer and accept bribes more frequently.  
                                                 
32 It was clear from the survey responses that we collected and the questions we received after the experiments that 
for some of the subjects the purpose of the bribe, i.e., whether it was for a “good” purpose, mattered.    26
Treatments 2 and 3 were conducted in Australia, Indonesia and Singapore. Figure 6 and 
Table 3, Panel A(ii) show that subject behaviour in Australia was more in accordance with what 
one would expect under the second scenario. The frequency with which a bribe was offered was 
higher in the welfare-reducing game (88% versus 79%) although this difference is significant at 
the 10% level only. The frequency with which the bribe was accepted was also higher in the 
welfare-reducing game (89% versus 81%) although this difference is not statistically significant. 
There are no significant differences in the amount of the bribe offered ($7.57 in Treatment 3 
versus $7.65 in Treatment 2). 
  The citizens had a significantly lower propensity to punish in the welfare-reducing game 
(42% versus 62%, p = 0.02). Hence, when the bribe had a larger negative impact on the payoff of 
the citizen, relatively more citizens did not want to forego even more money in order to punish 
the firm and the official. Interestingly, while fewer citizens punished in the welfare-reducing 
bribe game, those who did punish punished by considerably larger amounts ($7.74 versus $5.98, 
p = 0.06). This suggests that while the larger harm imposed on the citizen by the bribery 
discouraged some citizens from choosing to punish, those that did punish felt particularly 
affronted by the corrupt behaviour. They chose to punish by higher amounts either because of a 
concern for the welfare-reducing aspect of corruption or because of feelings of negative 
reciprocity.
33  
  As shown in Table 3, Panels B and C, we find no significant differences in the 
propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour across the two treatments in Indonesia and 
Singapore. The point estimates show that, unlike in Australia, the bribe rate was higher in the 
welfare-enhancing treatment than in the welfare-reducing treatment. This indicates that the 
subjects in these countries were more concerned about the welfare-reducing impact of the bribe. 
                                                 
33 The regression results in Table 6 are consistent with the reported t-statistics.    27
However, t-tests, Wilcoxon rank sum tests, and regression analysis show that the differences 
between the two treatments in terms of the bribe rates, bribe amounts and acceptance rates are 
not statistically significant.  
  The punishment behaviour in Indonesia and Singapore is not statistically different across 
the two treatments either. However, in Singapore the punishment rate in the welfare-enhancing 
treatment is lower than the punishment rate in the welfare-reducing treatment (44% versus 57%). 
These results contrast with the results we have for Australia and Indonesia, where the 
punishment rate was lower in the welfare-reducing treatment. As in the case of Australia, the 
average punishment amount in Indonesia is higher in Treatment 3 than in Treatment 2 ($7.36 as 
opposed to $5.59 respectively), but the difference is only marginally significant and only with a 
one-tailed test.
34 
  In summary, when we consider the impact of the cost of bribery on subject behaviour, we 
find that the results are culture-specific. In Australia, when the cost of bribery is higher, the 
propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour is higher, the propensity to punish corrupt behaviour is 
lower, and the punishment amounts are higher. This implies that those subjects who chose to 
punish were the ones that were especially concerned about the harm caused by bribery. In 
Indonesia and Singapore, there are no significant differences in subject behaviour across the two 
treatments although there were a larger number of subjects who chose not to bribe and to punish 
under the welfare-reducing treatment. This difference in behaviour across the three countries 
could be because subjects in Indonesia and Singapore have more immediate experiences of the 
negative impact of corruption and are, therefore, more willing to condemn it in the welfare 
reducing treatment.    
                                                 
34 The treatment-specific regression results for Indonesia and Singapore, reported in Table 6, Panels B and C, 
confirm the t-tests.     28
 
5. Concluding  Remarks  
Society’s attitudes towards corruption play an important role in the reduction of 
corruption. We have analysed the propensity to engage in and to punish corrupt behaviour in the 
context of a three-person sequential-move game involving a firm, a government official and a 
citizen. Our goal has been to understand whether attitudes towards corruption differ across 
cultures.  
Our experiments show that there is a larger cross-cultural variation in the propensity to 
punish corrupt acts than there is in the propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour. More 
specifically, our findings can be summarized in the following way. The results from India 
suggest that exposure to high levels of corruption may lead to a tolerance of and perpetuation of 
corrupt behaviour. Moreover, comparing Australia and India suggests that lower levels of 
exposure to corruption may not result in a decrease in the propensity to engage in corrupt 
behaviour, but may result in an increase in the propensity to punish corrupt behaviour. 
Surprisingly, in Indonesia, another country with a high level of corruption according to 
the traditional measures of corruption, the tendency to engage in and the willingness to punish 
corrupt behaviour is not much different from Australia. One reading of these results is that the 
recent democratization and increased press freedom have led to a hardening of attitudes against 
corruption, at least in the short run. These institutional changes may have created a receptive 
audience for policies aimed at reducing corruption in the future. This is important since anti-
corruption measures are more likely to be successful if there is popular support for such 
measures. A population that is motivated to fight corruption and impose penalties on those who 
engage in corrupt behaviour is more likely to support the political and bureaucratic reforms 
aimed at reducing corruption.   29
  Finally, in Singapore, we find some evidence to suggest that there is a higher propensity 
to engage in and a lower propensity to punish corrupt behaviour as compared to Australia. 
However, the punishment rates are higher in Singapore than they are in India. The results from 
India and Singapore are in line with our hypothesis that the existing level of corruption affects 
attitudes towards corruption. A comparison of the results from Australia and Singapore suggests 
that attitudes towards corruption may take a long time to change. Singapore is a country with a 
relatively recent history of combating corruption. Its success demonstrates that an effective 
punishment system can go a long way towards reducing corruption. Although the attitudes 
towards corruption in Singapore seem to have hardened, the subjects in Singapore still seem to 
display a greater propensity to engage in corrupt acts and a greater tolerance of corruption than 
Australia.  
  These results are in line with the declared goals of one of the most successful anti-
corruption bodies, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which was formed 
in Hong Kong in 1974: “To change people’s behaviour so that they will not engage in corrupt 
behaviour initially for fear of detection (deterrence), later because they cannot (prevention), and 
yet later because they do not wish to (attitude change).”
35 The main difference between the 
ICAC and the previous approaches was that the ICAC combined new incentives with a change in 
values. Its success has made Hong Kong an example of how promoting ethical values against 
corruption can work. 
  Our results also show that a more effective punishment regime leads to less corruption. 
However, the results are less clear cut when we consider the impact of the cost of bribery on 
subject behaviour.  In Australia, when corruption is welfare reducing, we find that fewer subjects 
were willing to punish. In contrast, more subjects were willing to punish in the welfare-reducing 
                                                 
35 This example is cited in Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002). Italics are added.    30
bribe game as compared with the welfare-enhancing bribe game in Indonesia and Singapore. 
However, the observed differences are not statistically significant.  
  Our paper suggests several interesting avenues for future research. The results from 
Indonesia and Singapore suggest that it would be valuable to do further research to define more 
precisely the role institutional change may play in changing attitudes towards corruption. One 
way to do this is to investigate how attitudes towards corruption change over time in a given 
location. Additionally it would be useful to develop theoretical models to understand the 
mechanism through which institutional change may help reduce corruption. Further research 
involving other countries with varying levels of corruption would also be valuable  
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Figure 3: Overview of the Results 
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Figure 4: Cultural Effects - Bribe Behaviour 
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Figure 5: Cultural Effects - Punishment Behaviour 
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Figure 6: Treatment Effects (Australia) 
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Table 1: Experimental Design 
 
 










(N = 888) 
N = 279 
Games = 93 
N = 363 
Games = 121 
N = 246 
Games = 82 
India 
(N = 309) 
N =309 
Games = 103  -- -- 
Indonesia 
(N = 360)  --  N = 180 
Games = 60 
N = 180 
Games = 60 
Singapore 
(N = 378)  --  N = 195 
Games = 65 
N = 183 
Games = 61 
Total  
(N = 1935) 
N = 588 
Games = 196 
N = 738 
Games = 246 
N = 609 
Games = 203 
   40







(Treatment 1)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  95.70  94.17  0.63 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.70  7.37  0.03 
% of officials accepting  91.01  89.69  0.76 
% of citizens punishing  53.09  24.14  0.0001 




 (Treatment 2) 
Indonesia 
(Treatment 2)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  78.51  80.00  0.82 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.65  7.50  0.30 
% of officials accepting  81.05  77.08  0.58 
% of citizens punishing  62.34  72.97  0.27 






(Treatment 3)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  87.80  78.33  0.13 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.57  7.32  0.16 
% of officials accepting  88.89  78.72  0.13 
% of citizens punishing  42.19  59.46  0.10 




 (Treatment 2) 
Singapore 
(Treatment 2)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  78.51  86.15  0.21 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.65  7.63  0.83 
% of officials accepting  81.05  89.29  0.18 
% of citizens punishing  62.34  44.00  0.04 






(Treatment 3)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  87.80  83.61  0.48 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.57  7.59  0.90 
% of officials accepting  88.89  96.08  0.15 
% of citizens punishing  42.19  57.14  0.12 




 (Treatment 2) 
Singapore 
(Treatment 2)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  80.00  86.15  0.36 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.50  7.63  0.48 
% of officials accepting  77.08  89.29  0.10 
% of citizens punishing  72.97  44.00  0.01 






(Treatment 3)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  78.33  83.61  0.46 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.32  7.59  0.19 
% of officials accepting  78.72  96.08  0.01 
% of citizens punishing  59.46  57.14  0.83 
Punishment amount (if >0)  7.36  7.11  0.84   41
 
Table 3: Differences in Means (t-tests) - Treatment Effects 
 
A. Australia 
(i)  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  p-value 
% firms bribing  95.70  78.51  0.0003 
Bribe Amount (if >0)  7.70  7.65  0.69 
% officials accepting  91.01  81.05  0.05 
% citizens punishing  53.09  62.34  0.24 
Punishment Amount (if >0)  5.40  5.98  0.40 
     
(ii)  Treatment 2  Treatment 3  p-value 
% firms bribing  78.51  87.80  0.09 
Bribe Amount (if >0)  7.65  7.57  0.49 
% officials accepting  81.05  88.89  0.17 
% citizens punishing  62.34  42.19  0.02 
Punishment Amount (if >0)  5.98  7.74  0.06 
     
B. Singapore     
(iii)  Treatment 2  Treatment 3  p-value 
% firms bribing  86.15  83.61  0.69 
Bribe Amount (if >0)  7.63  7.59  0.83 
% officials accepting  89.29  96.08  0.19 
% citizens punishing  44.00  57.14  0.19 
Punishment Amount (if >0)  7.23  7.11  0.92 
     
C. Indonesia     
(iv)  Treatment 2  Treatment 3  p-value 
% firms bribing  80.00  78.33  0.82 
Bribe Amount (if >0)  7.50  7.32  0.40 
% officials accepting  77.08  78.72  0.85 
% citizens punishing  72.97  59.46  0.22 
Punishment Amount (if >0)  5.59  7.36  0.18 
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Table 4: Multivariate Regression Results - Cultural Effects 
 
A. Australia vs. India vs. Indonesia vs. Singapore, All Treatments, Pooled Regression (Australia and Treatment 2 are the reference dummies.) 
  Bribe (0/1)  Bribe Amount  Accept (0/1)  Punish (0/1)  Punishment Amount 
                              
  1  2    3  4   5  6   7  8   9  10  
  M. Effect
♣  p-value   Coeff  p-value    M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
  M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
 Coeff  p-value   
Treatment 1  0.135  0.003  ⌂ 0.028 0.83    0.075  0.09  # -0.044  0.56    -0.906  0.23   
Treatment  3  0.021  0.46   -0.091 0.34   0.048  0.13   -0.078  0.18    1.148  0.05 * 
India  0.026  0.71   -0.424 0.02  * -0.013  0.84   -0.248  0.01  ⌂ -2.602 0.02  * 
Indonesia  0.037  0.41   -0.300  0.08 # -0.043  0.45   0.123  0.18  -1.249  0.16   
Singapore 0.080  0.05  * -0.085  0.61    0.086  0.07  # -0.049  0.57    -0.512  0.56   
Male  0.049  0.06  # 0.064  0.42   0.  025  0.38   -0.062  0.19   0.900  0.08  # 
Econ major  0.039  0.19    0.099  0.25    0.062  0.05  * -0.159  0.003  ⌂ 0.045 0.94   
% life out of Australia  0.102  0.05  * -0.122  0.47    0.001  0.63    -0.019  0.83    -1.323  0.12   
Bribe  amount              0.009  0.53   -0.010  0.70   0.337  0.25   
const       7.693  0.00  ⌂           4.149  0.07  # 
                              
R-squared 0.063  0.01  0.047  0.069  0.066 
N 643  553  554  481  238 
 
B. Australia vs. India, Treatment 1 (Australia is the reference dummy.) 
India  0.012  0.83   -0.668 0.02  * 0.015  0.81   -0.273  0.02  * -2.060  0.03 * 
Male  0.025  0.44   0.183  0.21   0.064  0.13   -0.011  0.89    0.320  0.63  
Econ major  0.017  0.62    0.294  0.06  # 0.097  0.04  * -0.158  0.06  # 0.001  1.00   
% life out of Australia  0.046  0.47    -0.364  0.24    0.077  0.30    -0.063  0.63    -0.572  0.54   
Bribe  amount              0.009  0.63   -0.025  0.55   0.129  0.74   
const       7.774  0.00  ⌂           4.621  0.11   
                              
R-squared 0.019  0.034  0.078  0.087  0.025 
N 195  185  185  168  64   43
 
C. Australia vs. Indonesia vs. Singapore, Treatment 2 (Australia is the reference dummy.) 
  Bribe (0/1)  Bribe Amount  Accept (0/1)  Punish (0/1)  Punishment Amount 
                              
  1  2    3  4   5  6   7  8   9  10  
  M. Effect
♣  p-value   Coeff  p-value    M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
  M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
 Coeff  p-value   
Indonesia 0.133  0.06  # -0.095  0.68    0.031  0.72    0.053  0.70    -1.297  0.34   
Singapore 0.197  0.003  ⌂ 0.043 0.85    0.143  0.08  # -0.221  0.10  # 0.486  0.73   
Male 0.103  0.04  * 0.017  0.89    -0.0003  1.00    -0.112  0.17    1.508  0.09  # 
Econ  major  0.031  0.57   0.107  0.41   0.066  0.29   -0.143  0.13    -0.712  0.49  
% life out of Australia  0.248  0.01  ⌂ 0.107 0.68    0.110  0.26    -0.053  0.72    -0.892  0.55   
Bribe amount              -0.041  0.27    -0.049  0.29    0.238  0.61   
const       7.551  0.00  ⌂           4.479  0.22   
                              
R-squared 0.054  -0.014  0.037  0.061  0.0002 
N 245  198  199  164  97 
 
D. Australia vs. Indonesia vs. Singapore, Treatment 3 (Australia is the reference dummy.) 
Indonesia -0.284  0.10  # -0.322  0.28    -0.395  0.19    0.242  0.09  # -2.661  0.17   
Singapore  -0.205  0.22   -0.077  0.79   -0.131  0.59   0.191  0.17  -2.714  0.14   
Male  0.010  0.85   0.060  0.68   -0.017  0.72   -0.019  0.82    0.418  0.69  
Econ  major  0.075  0.22   -0.164 0.34   0.006  0.91   -0.147  0.14    0.870  0.52  
% life out of Australia  -0.170  0.29    -0.125  0.70    -0.238  0.28    0.082  0.61    -3.137  0.14   
Bribe  amount              0.028  0.19   0.047  0.33   0.633  0.33   
const       7.668  0.00  ⌂           4.706  0.38   
                              
R-squared 0.029  -0.007  0.092  0.039  -0.025 
N 203  170  170  149  77 
♣ We report marginal effects for the probits. * (#, ⌂) denotes statistical significance at the 5% (10%, 1%) level. 
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E. Singapore vs. Australia vs. Indonesia, Treatment 2 (Singapore is the reference dummy.) 
  Bribe (0/1)  Bribe Amount  Accept (0/1)  Punish (0/1)  Punishment Amount 
                              
  1  2    3  4   5  6   7  8   9  10  
  M. Effect
♣  p-value   Coeff  p-value    M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
  M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
 Coeff  p-value   
Australia   -0.244  0.003  ⌂ -0.043 0.85    -0.168  0.08  # 0.215  0.10  # -0.486  0.73   
Indonesia -0.097  0.21    -0.138  0.40    -0.151  0.08  # 0.251  0.01  ⌂ -1.783 0.13   
Male  0.103  0.04  * 0.017  0.89  -0.0003  1.00   -0.112  0.17   1.508  0.09  # 
Econ  major  0.031  0.57   0.107  0.41   0.066  0.29   -0.143  0.13    -0.712  0.49  
% life out of Australia  0.248  0.01  ⌂ 0.107  0.68   0.110  0.26   -0.053  0.72  -0.892  0.55   
Bribe  amount              -0.041  0.27   -0.049  0.29   0.238  0.61   
const       7.594  0.00  ⌂           4.965  0.18   
                              
R-squared 0.054  -0.014  0.037  0.061  0.0002 
N 245  198  199  164  97 
 
F. Singapore vs. Australia vs. Indonesia, Treatment 3 (Singapore is the reference dummy.) 
Australia    0.166  0.22   0.077  0.79   0.105  0.59   -0.192  0.17    2.714  0.14  
Indonesia  -0.063  0.35    -0.246  0.20    -0.203  0.02  * 0.057 0.62    0.053 0.97   
Male  0.010  0.85   0.060  0.68   -0.017  0.72   -0.019  0.82    0.418  0.69  
Econ  major  0.075  0.22   -0.164 0.34   0.006  0.91   -0.147  0.14    0.870  0.52  
% life out of Australia  -0.170  0.29    -0.125  0.70    -0.238  0.28    0.082  0.61    -3.137  0.14   
Bribe  amount              0.028  0.19   0.047  0.33   0.633  0.33   
const       7.592  0.00  ⌂           1.992  0.70   
                              
R-squared 0.029  -0.007  0.092  0.039  -0.025 
N 203  170  170  149  77 
♣ We report marginal effects for the probits. * (#, ⌂) denotes statistical significance at the 5% (10%, 1%) level. 
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Table 5: Survey Responses: Reasons for Punishing/Not Punishing  
 
A. Reasons for punishing (as a percentage of those who had a chance to punish) 
  Overall Location 
   Australia  India  Indonesia  Singapore 
Moral 
responsibility  
27.4% 32.0% 13.8% 39.2% 20.2% 
reduce corruption   14.3%  17.6%  8.0%  20.3%  8.1% 
fairness    13.5%  12.2% 4.6% 23.0%  15.2% 
Negative 
reciprocity 
11.0% 9.9%  0.0% 21.6%  15.2% 
 
B. Reasons for not punishing (as a percentage of those who did not punish) 
profit  maximizing    90.6% 91.3% 87.9% 80.0% 98.0% 
difficult to change 
the system or 
ineffective 
punishment system  
20.5% 10.6% 21.2% 48.0% 18.4% 
bribe may be for a 
good purpose or 
may be necessary 
2.9% 3.8% 0.0%  12.0%  0.0%   46
Table 6: Multivariate Regression Results - Treatment Effects 
 
A. Australia (Treatments 1, 2 and 3; Treatment 2 is the reference dummy.) 
  Bribe (0/1)  Bribe Amount  Accept (0/1)  Punish (0/1)  Punishment Amount 
                              
  1  2    3  4   5  6   7  8   9  10  
  M. Effect
♣  p-value   Coeff  p-value    M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
  M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
 Coeff  p-value   
Treatment 1  0.136  0.001  ⌂ 0.041 0.72    0.070  0.10  # -0.108  0.19    -0.765  0.29   
Treatment 3  0.064  0.10  # -0.091  0.45    0.044  0.31    -0.217  0.01  ⌂ 1.584 0.06  # 
Male 0.067  0.07  # -0.095  0.32    0.067  0.09  # -0.099  0.16    1.328  0.05  * 
Econ major  0.085  0.04  * 0.032  0.76    0.141  0.002  ⌂ -0.260 0.001  ⌂ 0.710 0.39   
% life out of Australia  0.081  0.10  # -0.138  0.33    0.032  0.53    0.010  0.91         
Bribe amount              -0.032  -1.05    -0.065  0.16    0.273  0.49   
Constant       7.803  0.00  ⌂           4.284  0.16   
                              
R-squared 0.112  -0.007  0.107  0.067  0.069 
N 295  255  255  222  118 
 
B. Singapore (Treatments 2 and 3; Treatment 3 is the reference dummy.) 
Treatment  2  0.023  0.72   0.040  0.81   -0.064  0.17   -0.108  0.29    0.089  0.94  
Male  0.010  0.89   0.301  0.09  # -0.040  0.38   -0.142  0.17    -1.043  0.40 # 
Econ  major  0.031  0.71   -0.058 0.79   0.038  0.48   -0.120  0.37    2.673  0.13  
Bribe  amount              -0.040  0.35   0.014  0.80   0.134  0.85   
Constant       7.485  0.00  ⌂           6.084  0.28   
                              
R-squared 0.003  0.003  0.074  0.033  -0.016 
N 126  107  107  99  50 
♣ We report marginal effects for the probits. * (#, ⌂) denotes statistical significance at the 5% (10%, 1%) level. 
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C. Indonesia (Treatments 2 and 3; Treatment 3 is the reference dummy.) 
  Bribe (0/1)  Bribe Amount  Accept (0/1)  Punish (0/1)  Punishment Amount 
                              
  1  2    3  4   5  6   7  8   9  10  
  M. Effect
♣  p-value   Coeff  p-value    M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
  M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
 Coeff  p-value   
Treatment  2  0.008  0.92   0.197  0.36   -0.055  0.53   0.184  0.12  -2.597  0.05  * 
Male  0.048  0.53   -0.211 0.33   -0.026  0.77   -0.024  0.84    2.740  0.04 * 
Econ  major  -0.001  0.99   0.253  0.27   0.157  0.11   0.165  0.23  -2.943  0.06  # 
Bribe  amount              -0.051  0.18   0.039  0.50   0.601  0.38   
Constant       7.328  0.00  ⌂           2.785  0.61   
                              
R-squared 0.004  -0.002  0.043  0.035  0.119 
N 120  95  95  74  49 




Table A1: The 2003 Corruptions Perceptions Index  
 
RANK COUNTRY  SCORE 
1. Finland  9.7 
2. Iceland  9.6 
3.  Denmark 
New Zealand  9.5 
5. Singapore  9.4 
…    
7. Netherlands  8.9 
8.  Australia  8.8 
…    
11. United  Kingdom  8.7 
…    
18.  Ireland 
USA  7.5 
…    
25. Portugal  6.6 
…    
35.  Italy 
Kuwait  5.3 












86.  Russia 
Mozambique  2.7 
…    
122.  Indonesia 
Kenya  1.9 
…    
133. Bangladesh  1.3 
    
Source: Transparency International 
 
 